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Abstract
This paper focuses on a single ﬁrm with constant returns to scale in
a multi-period setting with incomplete markets and a single good per
state. Proﬁts vanish whenever the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts with respect
to a given price system. The paper addresses the following question:
Shall the ﬁrm always act as a price taker? In the case of a partnership,
there are no initial shares and no proﬁts accrue from production. A
corporation, however, has initial shareholders and can sell its output
at any price. An example shows that this additional freedom can
improve eﬃciency and welfare. This results from the fact that a wedge
between price and cost can mitigate the ineﬃciency caused by the
consumers who disregard the impact of their initial portfolio decisions
on subsequent markets.
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1 Introduction.
This paper focuses on a single ﬁrm with constant returns to scale in a setting
with incomplete markets, more than 2 time periods and a single good per
state. Whenever the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts with respect to a given price
system, the price of the output equals its production cost. The paper ad-
dresses the following question: Shall the ﬁrm always act as a price taker or
is it possible to improve eﬃciency and welfare by selling the output above or
below costs?
This question is studied from a purely normative perspective in a partic-
ularly simple and transparent model. The only assets are shares in the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm faces no competition and there is no strategic interaction.
Two diﬀerent types of ﬁrms, partnerships and corporations, are compared;
see 31 and 32 of Magill and Quinzii (1996), henceforth referred to as MQ.
The main diﬀerence between the types is that a partnership has no initial
owners whereas a corporation is initially owned by consumers. In the case of
a corporation, the initial shares δi ≥ 0 with∑i δi = 1 are given exogenously
and traded at t = 0.
In the case of a partnership, a group of consumers gets together to found
a ﬁrm. Because of constant returns to scale, there are no incentives to ex-
clude a consumer. Suppose the partnership chooses the production plan
y = (y0, y+) ∈ R− × RS+, where |y0| = C denotes the cost to be paid at
t = 0 and y+ the stochastic dividend stream accruing at S future states.
Each partner i chooses his share ϑi0 of the production plan. In equilibrium,∑
i ϑ
i
0 = 1.
By deﬁnition, a partnership provides its output y+ in exchange for the
production cost. Thus, the above question can be reformulated as follows.
Shall ﬁrms be organized as partnerships? When there are only two periods,
partnerships have a solid theoretical foundation as shown in the seminal
article by Drèze (1974). In this case, the shares ϑi0 are the ﬁnal shares and
the ﬁrm should maximize proﬁts with respect to the price system pi =
∑
i pi
iϑi0
where pii is consumer i's state price system (or vector of stochastic discount
factors).
In the case of a corporation, consumer i is endowed with the initial share
δi ≥ 0 where ∑i δi = 1. That is to say, i owns the share δi of the ﬁrm's
production plan y = (y0, y+). This obliges i to pay δ
i|y0| at t = 0. Fur-
thermore, δi entitles i to receive δiy+. This right can be sold on the stock
market at t = 0 at the market clearing price q0. Trading at t = 0 converts
the initial shares δ into intermediate shares denoted ϑ0 which are carried over
to the next period. Consumer i's net payment to obtain the share ϑi0 ≥ 0 is
(ϑi0 − δi)q0. In equilibrium, q0 is such that
∑
i ϑ
i
0 =
∑
i δ
i = 1. The price q0
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can be lower or higher than the production cost C. The deﬁnition of a cor-
poration is silent about the relationship between production cost and output
value.
There is a stock market at any non-terminal state s. Shares carried over
to s are traded at price qs. Let ϑ
i
s denote i's shares carried over from s to
one of its successors. In a stock market equilibrium,
∑
i ϑ
i
s = 1 for every
non-terminal s.
Apart from t = 0, there is no diﬀerence between the description of a
partnership or a corporation. Loosely speaking, a partnership is a corporation
with constant returns to scale, a missing stock market at t = 0, and price
taking behavior. Can the richer framework of a corporation provide socially
desirable opportunities?
When one wants to convert a corporation with constant returns to scale
into a partnership one has to abolish the initial shares δi. This can be
done by imposing the pricing rule q0 = C, which is a special case of the
marginal cost pricing rule. In a corporation, i's consumption at t = 0 is xi0 =
ei0−δiC+(δi−ϑi0)q0 = ei0+δi(q0−C)−ϑi0q0 where ei0 is i's initial endowment
at t = 0. If q0 = C the initial shares δ
i vanish so that xi0 = e
i
0 − ϑi0C as in
the partnership.
It is instructive to consider the case in which, for every consumer i, the
initial shares δi coincide with the shares ϑi0 deliberately chosen by i at t = 0.
Then i's demand xi0 = e
i
0−δiC+(δi−ϑi0)q0 for good 0 in the case of a corpo-
ration coincides with i's demand xi0 = e
i
0 − ϑi0C in the case of a partnership
for every i at t = 0. However, unless i's utility is quasilinear, δi will typically
impact i's demand for shares at subsequent stock markets. Therefore, the
original shares δi typically create long lasting market repercussions although
the individual shareholdings remain unchanged during the initial period.
Social welfare maximization takes into account how the original shares δi
impact market outcomes. When the initial shares are sold below costs the
net sellers of initial shares subsidize the net buyers. When the shares are
sold above cost the redistribution of wealth is reversed. In a partnership, all
market transactions leave the distribution of wealth unaltered.
The objective of a ﬁrm used in this paper can be described most easily in
the case of a corporation. Assume for simplicity that every consumer holds
at least a tiny amount of initial shares so that the welfare of the initial owners
coincides with the welfare of the society. This assumption rules out that the
group of initial owners exploits the rest of the economy. The corporation
chooses, as in a Cournot model, an output vector y+. All functions used to
analyze the model depend directly or indirectly on y+. When the production
plan y has been chosen, consumer i possesses the intermediate endowment
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ei + δiy where ei ∈ R(S+1)+ is i's initial endowment. Consumers anticipate
the market clearing prices correctly and determine their optimal trades on
all markets. In equilibrium, all markets clear.
Every utility function is normalized such that the marginal utility of good
0 equals 1 at the optimum. The (indirect) social welfare function W(y+) is
the sum of all normalized indirect utility functions. The corporation chooses
its production such that the ﬁrst order condition DW(y+) = 0 for welfare
maximization is satisﬁed. For a more extensive explanation, see Section 2.
In the case of a partnership, the basic principle is the same. However,
the ﬁrm takes the constraint q0 = C into account. The partnership aims
to satisfy the ﬁrst order condition for constrained welfare maximization. It
is worth emphasizing that the degree of complexity of multi-period models
of production economies with incomplete markets in the Walrasian tradition
comes close to that of models with Cournot competition.
1.1 Relationship to the literature
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) introduce a model that combines Cournot-Nash
competition with Walrasian exchange of consumption goods under the as-
sumption that markets are complete. The basic idea can be described as
follows. The consumption goods are produced by ﬁrms who need non-
marketable primary factors as inputs. Every ﬁrm chooses its production plan.
The consumers possess preassigned shares of the ﬁrms, provide the primary
factors in accordance with their shares, and receive their shares of the ﬁrms'
output. Thereafter, Walrasian exchange of the consumption goods takes
place at market clearing prices. The main diﬀerence between Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972) and the present paper is that they focus on oligopolistic
competition whereas this paper focuses on market incompleteness.
Both papers have in common that they deal with preassigned, initial
shares. First, the production plans are chosen. Thereafter, the output is
distributed and the consumers obtain their intermediate endowments. Fi-
nally, Walrasian exchange takes place and the intermediate endowments are
traded at their equilibrium prices. In multi-period models of corporations,
Walrasian exchange occurs repeatedly. Both papers deal with the redistribu-
tion of initial wealth, however, from diﬀerent perspectives. Gabszewicz and
Vial focus on the proﬁt motive of oligopolists whereas this papers abstracts
from that motive and uses redistribution in order to enhance eﬃciency and
welfare.
Guesnerie (1975) points out that a redistribution of wealth can be needed
in order to achieve a Pareto improvement when one leaves the classical Arrow-
Debreu framework. In his paper, the aggregate production set fails to be con-
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vex and marginal cost pricing becomes a necessary requirement for Pareto
eﬃciency. Several marginal cost pricing equilibria exist, however, none of
them is Pareto eﬃcient given the distribution of the ﬁrms' proﬁts or losses.
In order to obtain a Pareto eﬃcient marginal cost pricing equilibrium, the
original distribution scheme needs to be changed. According to the funda-
mental theorems of welfare economics, no such problem arises in the convex
case.
The situation is similar when preferences and technologies are convex and
markets are incomplete. Section 3 of this paper presents an example of an
economy with three types of consumers. One of the types has a quasilinear
utility function. When all initial shares are held by the quasilinear type, the
initial shares δi do not impact the demand for the intermediate shares ϑi0
due to the absence of income eﬀects. Otherwise, the income eﬀects impact,
directly or indirectly, all market clearing prices. The more initial shares
are held by non-quasilinear consumers, the larger is the potential impact of
initial shares on stock market prices. By driving a wedge between q0 and
C, initial shares can impact all market clearing prices. The introduction of
initial shares resembles the introduction of a tax in an economy with distorted
markets. Initial shares provide corporations with a tool that can help to reduce
existing distortions. This tool is not available in a multi-period partnership.
There is a long tradition to assume competitive behavior in general equi-
librium models with or without incomplete markets. Grossman and Hart
(1979) use competitive price perceptions in two- as well as multi-period mod-
els with corporations. In their paper, a corporation maximizes proﬁts with
respect to a convex combinations of utility gradients where the weights are
the initial shares δi. This paper, however, makes the point, that ineﬃciencies
caused by consumption decisions in a multi-period setting can be mitigated by
corporations provided that there are no competitive price perceptions and all
market interactions are correctly taken into account.1
Multi-period partnerships have been analyzed in Dierker (2015) in order
to generalize the original Drèze rule. The generalized Drèze rule is much
more complex than the classical Drèze rule in the two-period case. In par-
ticular, it takes all individual transactions into account and the price system
can no longer be expressed in terms of utility gradients. The diﬀerence be-
tween the two- and the multi-period case is due to the fact that the envelope
theorem can no longer be applied when there are more than two periods. The
treatment of multi-period partnerships in this paper follows Dierker (2015).
1Competitive price perceptions can entail unintended welfare losses in multi-period
models because beneﬁcial redistribution of wealth caused by initial shares are ruled out.
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2 Model and conceptual background.
2.1 Corporations, partnerships, and their objectives.
It suﬃces to consider a three-period economy whose underlying date-event
tree has the initial state s = 0 at t = 0 and states s = 1, . . . , S at t > 0.
There is a single good per state and a single ﬁrm with constant returns
to scale technology Y ⊂ R− × RS+. The ﬁrm can be a corporation or a
partnership.
To deﬁne social welfare in either case, every (indirect) utility function is
normalized such that the marginal utility of good 0 equals 1 at the equilibrium
allocation under consideration. That is to say, if one additional marginal
unit of good 0 becomes available at the reference equilibrium, social welfare
increases by one unit independently of who consumes the marginal unit of
good 0. Consumer i's normalized utility gradient pii describes i's state price
system or vector of stochastic discount factors. The social welfare of a group
of consumers is the sum of the normalized indirect utility functions of its
members. This paper focuses on the social welfare of all consumers.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a corporation. There is a stock market at each
non-terminal node. The implicit function theorem is used to express all
functions directly or indirectly as functions of y+. First one determines, for
every consumer i and every non-terminal node s, the demand ϑis(y+) for
shares which determine i's consumption xi(y+). Then one solves the system
of market clearing equations to obtain an equilibrium price vector.
In a corporation economy, the output y+ is sold at the market clearing
price q0(y+). The set of stock market equilibria is characterized by
Ycorp = {y+ ⊂ proj2Y |
∑
i
ϑis(y+) = 1 for every non-terminal state s},
where proj2 denotes the projection to RS+.
Assume that there is a planner who can choose the production plan and
make inﬁnitesimal transfers of good 0.2 Can the planner ﬁnd a ﬁrst order
Pareto improvement over the allocation of the reference equilibrium induced
by y∗+? To answer this question, deﬁne social welfare as
Wy∗(y+) =
∑
i
U i(xi(y+))
∂0U i(xi(y∗+))
. (1)
2A planner associated with constrained eﬃciency is much stronger because he can also
assign shares to consumers.
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Whenever DWy∗(y∗+) does not vanish, a ﬁrst order Pareto improvement ex-
ists. To avoid such equilibria, corporations are required to satisfy the ﬁrst
order condition DWy∗(y∗+) = 0 for welfare maximization. When one diﬀer-
entiates Wy∗(y+) with respect to ys, s = 1, . . . , S, one obtains, dropping the
arguments, the ﬁrst order condition
∂sy0 +
I∑
i=1
S∑
σ=1
piiσ ∂sx
i
σ = 0 for s = 1, . . . , S. (2)
The objective of the corporation is to satisfy condition (2). A stock market
equilibrium is a corporation equilibrium iﬀ DWy∗(yˆ∗) = 0. Observe that
equation (2) is signiﬁcantly more complex than a convex combination of
utility gradients pii. In contrast to the two-period case, piiσ ∂sx
i
σ does typically
not vanish when s 6= σ.
In a two-period model, the condition DWy∗(y∗+) = 0 characterizes Drèze
equilibria. Originally, the concept of a Drèze equilibrium has been based on
the ﬁrst order condition for constrained eﬃciency [see Drèze (1974)]. This ef-
ﬁciency concept is no longer appropriate when there are at least three periods
or multiple goods per state because exchange economies become generically
constrained ineﬃcient [see Geanakoplos et al. (1986)]. The eﬃciency concept
used in this paper is much less demanding than constrained eﬃciency. It
has been introduced under the name of minimal (constrained) eﬃciency in
Dierker et al. (2005)) in a two-period model.
The planner associated with minimal eﬃciency cannot aﬀect future con-
sumption other than by choosing production plans. Thus, future consump-
tion is constrained in the same way as in the case of welfare maximization.
Consider the following procedure. At the ﬁrst stage, the planner chooses
production plans. At the second stage, the consumers, who have correct
expectations of the production plans and the market clearing prices, choose
their shares and determine their consumption plans. At the ﬁnal stage, when
all stock markets are closed so that shareholdings cannot be changed, the
planner can redistribute the total consumption at t = 0. An allocation is
minimally constrained eﬃcient, or minimally eﬃcient for short, if this plan-
ner cannot make a Pareto improvement. For a formal deﬁnition of a cardinal
measure of minimal eﬃciency, see Subsection 2.3.
One may feel tempted to require the corporation to fulﬁll more than
the ﬁrst order condition for welfare maximization. However, the following
problem arises already in the two period case. In that particular setting,
the ﬁrst order condition for welfare maximization coincides with the ﬁrst
order condition for constrained eﬃciency. E. and H. Dierker (2010b) consider
two-period economies and present robust examples that show that a unique
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Drèze equilibrium can maximize welfare although it is not minimally eﬃcient.
The Drèze equilibrium can also minimize welfare although it is constrained
eﬃcient. This can be explained as follows.
Subsection 2.2 introduces two Hicksian surplus concepts, the compensated
and the equivalent surplus. The ﬁrst one measures eﬃciency changes and
the second one measures welfare changes. The diﬀerence between the two
surplus concepts is of second order. More precisely, the critical points of the
two surplus concepts coincide but the second derivatives at a critical point
can have diﬀerent signs. It is possible that one surplus function attains its
maximum where the other surplus function attains its minimum. Therefore,
the goal of a ﬁrm is deﬁned such that it does not discriminate between welfare
and eﬃciency maximization. This property is lost when one takes higher
order eﬀects into account.
Turn now to the case of partnership economies. At t = 0, every consumer
i can become a partner by obtaining the share ϑi0 > 0 of the output y+ in
exchange for the cost share ϑi0C. The partnership operates at a scale that is
determined by the condition
∑
i ϑ
i
0 = 1.
At t = 1, the partnership goes public. There is a stock market at every
non-terminal node s ≥ 1 on which the shares ϑis(y+) are sold at the market
clearing price qs(y+). In equilibrium, all stock markets clear, that is to say,∑
i ϑ
i
s(y+) = 1. A partnership equilibrium is a stock market equilibrium with
the property DWy∗(yˆ∗) = 0.
In the case of a partnership economy, the set of stock market equilibria
is characterized by
Ypart = {y+ ⊂ proj2Y | q0(y+) = C(y+) and
∑
i
ϑis(y+) = 1 for all markets}.
One might think that a partnership is driven by eﬃciency reasons to
satisfy q0 = C. However, this reasoning is ﬂawed. Price taking behavior
entails ineﬃciencies in the consumption sector because every price taking
consumer i ignores the impact to his choice of ϑi0 on subsequent market prices.
This entails that the constraint q0 = C must be explicitly incorporated in
the partnership's objective. Therefore, the equation
∑
i ϑ
i
0(y+) = 1 is used,
together with the deﬁnition of C(y+), in order to express yS as a function of
y1, . . . , yS−1.
In the two-period case, the envelope theorem applies. That is to say,
the chain rule can be disregarded when one evaluates DWy∗(y+) and utility
gradients together with the (ﬁnal) shareholdings suﬃce to express the ﬁrm's
goal. As a consequence, the ﬁrm pursues the goal to satisfy the ﬁrst order
condition for constrained eﬃciency that characterizes Drèze equilibria [see
Section 6 of Dierker (2015)].
8
2.2 A cardinal eﬃciency measure, a cardinal welfare
measure, and Kaldor-Hicks comparisons.
To shed light on the role of initial shares, a partnership equilibrium will
be compared to a corporation equilibrium for a given assignment of initial
shares. Call one of the equilibria A and the other one B. In many cases,
no Pareto comparison exists, but one can still perform tests à la Kaldor-
Hicks to compare A and B. Two tests will be applied, one is based on the
compensating variation CSy∗(y+), the other on the cardinal welfare measure
introduced below. Both measures are expressed in units of good 0.
Consider two equilibria, a reference equilibrium associated with y∗+, the
output at the status quo, and some alternative equilibrium associated with
the output y+. Assume that the move to the alternative has been carried
out and look backwards from y+ to the status quo at y
∗
+. Consumer i's
compensating surplus CSiy∗(y+) is the amount of good 0 which i has to lose
after the move from the reference stock market equilibrium to the alternative
equilibrium; cf. Hicks (1956) and E. and H. Dierker (2010b). That is to say,
CSiy∗(y+) compensates i for the move from y
∗
+ to y+. Formally, CS
i
y∗(y+) is
deﬁned implicitly by
U i(xi0(y+ − CSiy∗(y+), xi+(y+)) = U i(xi(y∗+)). (3)
The total compensating surplus associated with the change from y∗+ to y+ is
CSy∗(y+) =
∑
i
CSiy∗(y+). (4)
The total compensating surplus CSy∗(y+) is the amount of good 0 that can
be taken out of the economy at y+ without making any consumer worse oﬀ
than at y∗+. It is an indicator of the ineﬃciency of the status quo in com-
parison to the alternative. The reference equilibrium is minimally eﬃcient
iﬀ CSy∗(y+) ≤ CSy∗(y∗+) = 0 for all available alternatives y+. Observe that
the set of available alternatives depends on whether the ﬁrm is organized as
a corporation or a partnership.
A calculation shows that one obtains the ﬁrst order condition (2) that
is used to deﬁne the goal of a ﬁrm when one diﬀerentiates CSy∗(y+) par-
tially with respect to s using (3). Thus, the ﬁrst order condition for welfare
maximization coincides with the ﬁrst order condition for minimal eﬃciency.
The deﬁnition of social welfare in (1) may appear puzzling for the fol-
lowing reason. Wy∗ is deﬁned as the sum of normalized utility functions
that need not be cardinal. However, utilitarian welfare maximization relies
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on the interpersonal comparison of cardinal utility units. Therefore, Wy∗
seems to look like a utilitarian utility function although it is not. Only
the utility gradients are normalized. This suﬃces to deﬁne the goal of a
ﬁrm because condition (2) depends only on the interpersonal comparison of
marginal utility changes. The following surplus concept is based on cardinal
unit comparisons and leads to utilitarian welfare functions.
Assume now that the move from the status quo at y∗+ to the alterna-
tive equilibrium at y+ has not been made. Consumer i's equivalent surplus
ESiy∗(y+) is the amount of good 0 which i has to gain at y
∗
+ in order to be
indiﬀerent to the move to y+. Formally,
U i(xi0(y
∗
+) + ES
i
y∗(y+), x
i
+(y
∗
+)) = U
i(xi(y+). (5)
The total equivalent surplus associated with the change from y∗ to y+ is
ESy∗(y+) =
∑
i
ESiy∗(y+). (6)
Every alternative output plan y+ is evaluated with the same function
ESy∗ . This function is a utilitarian social welfare function because it mea-
sures, for every consumer i, the utility in additional units of good 0 at the
equilibrium allocation associated with y∗+. The plan y
∗
+ maximizes social
welfare iﬀ ESy∗(y+) ≤ ESy∗(y∗+) = 0 for all available alternatives y+. In the
case of a partnership, prices q0 6= C are not available whereas they are in
the case of a corporation. Formulae (5) and (6) will be used to measure the
welfare change caused by a move from y∗+ to y+.
Suppose the economy is in equilibrium A and consider the social welfare
function with the utility normalization made at A. A move from A to B
causes a welfare loss if this welfare function assigns a lower value to B.
That is to say, one needs to distribute less than the total initial endowment
available at A in order to generate the utility proﬁle attained at B.
Observe that a move from A to B causes an eﬃciency loss if and only if
a move from B to A causes a welfare gain. In the quasilinear case, eﬃciency
and welfare changes coincide. Otherwise, they may have diﬀerent signs. As
typical for surplus concepts, the ﬁrst order conditions for the compensating
and the equivalent surplus maximization coincide.
The issue of transitivity is avoided in this paper because only two equi-
libria at a time are compared. The joint use of both surplus concepts makes
it possible to compare equilibria also in cases in which they cannot be Pareto
ranked.
Consider a pair of economies that diﬀer only by the existence or absence
of original shares. It is shown that a partnership equilibrium can be Pareto
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dominated by a corporation equilibrium. Moreover, when a Pareto compar-
ison is impossible the Kaldor-Hicks criterion can, to some extent, be used to
conclude that a corporation equilibrium is socially preferable to a partnership
equilibrium. The following proposition answers the question: Shall a regula-
tor always impose the condition q0 = C that characterizes a partnership?
Proposition. A corporation does always as well as a partnership when it
imposes the constraint q0 = C. A partnership equilibrium, however, can be
Pareto dominated by a corporation equilibrium. When no Pareto comparison
can be made, it is still possible that a move from a partnership equilibrium
to a corporation equilibrium increases the total equivalent surplus as well as
the total compensating surplus.
3 Numerical example.
As shown in the introduction, consumer i's demand in the case of a part-
nership coincides with i's demand in the case of a corporation under the
constraint q0 = 0 because i's initial shares δ
i drop out. This section de-
scribes a numerical example of an economy that proves the essential part of
the above Proposition.
The basic intuition behind the Proposition can be described as follows.
Consider a partnership equilibrium with production plan y∗ that maximizes
CSy∗ as well as ESy∗ . Then DCSy∗(y
∗
+) = DESy∗(y
∗
+) is orthogonal to
the boundary of the set of all output plans y+ that satisfy the constraint
q0 = C. Therefore, one can improve welfare and eﬃciency when this con-
straint is slightly relaxed. In the subsequent example, consumers of type Q
have quasilinear utility functions. One can make the relaxation of q0 = C ar-
bitrarily small by assigning all but arbitrarily few initial shares to consumers
of type Q.
In the example, there are three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and seven states.
State 0 at t = 0 is followed by states 1 and 2 at t = 1. At t = 2, states 3 and
4 follow state 1 and states 5 and 6 follow state 2. There is a single good at
each state and a single ﬁrm. There are no securities other than shares in the
ﬁrm.
Consider three types of consumers, A,B and Q, with additively separable,
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concave utility functions. The utility function of type Q is quasilinear. Deﬁne
UA(x0, x1, . . . , x6) = 10 log(x0) + 1 log(x1) + 2 log(x2) + 3 log(x3)
+ 4 log(x4) + 5 log(x5) + 6 log(x6),
UB(x0, x1, . . . , x6) = 10 log(x0) + 3 log(x1) + 2 log(x2) + 1 log(x3)
+ 1 log(x4) + 2 log(x5) + 3 log(x6),
UQ(x0, x1, . . . , x6) = x0 + log(x1) + log(x2) + log(x3)
+ log(x4) + log(x5) + log(x6).
(7)
respectively. For simplicity, there are no initial endowments except at t = 0
and every consumer is endowed with eA0 = e
B
0 = e
Q
0 = 30. There are ten
consumers of type A, ten of type B and ﬁfty of type Q. A production
plan is denoted y = (y0, y+) ∈ R− × R6+ where y+ = (y1, . . . , y6). The cost|y0| = C(y+) is
C(y1, . . . , y6) = y1 + y2 + . . . , y6. (8)
The example has been chosen such that that a move from the partnership
equilibrium to a corporation equilibrium increases the total equivalent and
the total compensating surplus also when type Q holds few or even no initial
shares provided that types A and B possess similar amounts of initial shares.
Subsection 3.1 explains how the partnership equilibrium is computed and
presents the numerical solution. Subsection 3.2 explains the computation
of the corporation equilibrium. The relationship between the partnership
equilibrium and the corporation equilibria, which are parameterized by the
distribution of initial shares across types, is discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Partnership equilibrium.
In a partnership, consumer i consumes ei0 + ϑ
i
0y0 at t = 0. The consumption
at an intermediate node ξs is x
i
s = qs(ϑ
i
s− − ϑis) + ϑis−ys at t = 1, where ξs−
is the immediate predecessor of ξs. If ξs is a terminal node, then i consumes
xis = ϑ
i
s−ys. The size of the partnership is such that the initial investments
ϑi0 add up to 1.
The initial investment of a consumer of type A is ϑA0 = 630/(31 C), ϑ
A
1 =
2205(q1 + y1)/(124 q1 C), and ϑ
A
2 = 6930(q2 + y2)/(403 q2 C) where the
variable y+ has been dropped. For consumers of type B, one obtains ϑ
B
0 =
180/(11 C), ϑB1 = 72(q1 +q2)/(11 q1 C), and ϑ
B
2 = 900(q2 +y2)/(77 y2 C). A
consumer of type Q demands ϑQ0 = 6/C, ϑ
Q
1 = 4(q1 + q2)/(q1 C), and ϑ
Q
2 =
4(q2 + y2)/(q2 C). When the shares ϑ
i
0 add up to 1 then C = 227400/341 ≈
12
666.862. Solving the market clearing equations for markets 1 and 2 leads to
q1 = 60463/30497 y1 ≈ 1.983 y1 and q2 = 151693/55241 y2 ≈ 2.746 y2.
Let yˆ = (y1, . . . , y5). The cost function (8) is used to eliminate the last
component y6 of y+ by deﬁning
y6 = g(yˆ) = 227400/341− y1 − · · · − y5. (9)
The fact that C is constant results from the Cobb-Douglas nature of the
preferences for y+. In general, the implicit function theorem is used to deﬁne
g(yˆ). Equation (9) provides an equilibrium condition that must be taken into
account in a multi-period model.
Dropping the variable yˆ, i's consumption equals
xi = (ei0−ϑi0C, q1(ϑi0−ϑi1)+ϑi0y1, q2(ϑi0−ϑi2)+ϑi0y2, ϑi1y3, ϑi1y4, ϑi2y5, ϑi2g).
Let ui(yˆ) = U i(xi(yˆ)) be the utility i obtains when yˆ is chosen.
All consumers are partners so that the ﬁrm acts on behalf of the whole
society. Because xA0 = 30 − 630/31 = 300/31, A's marginal utility of good
0 equals 31/30. Similarly, B's marginal utility equals 11/15. Thus, both
normalization factors, nfA = 30/31 and nfB = 15/11, are independent of
the allocation. In the case of the quasilinear consumer Q, no normalization
is needed. Since there are 10 consumers of type A, 10 of type B, and 50 of
type Q social welfare is given by
W(yˆ) = 10 nfA UA(xA(yˆ)) + 10 nfB UB(xB(yˆ)) + 50 UQ(xQ(yˆ)). (10)
The ﬁrst order condition DW(yˆ) = 0 can be solved algebraically. For
simplicity, numerical approximations are used to replace fractions and one
obtains yˆ∗ ≈ (100.587, 96.6276, 92.6686, 102.346, 125.66). The cost is C =
227400/341 ≈ 666.862 and the last coordinate of the production plan y∗ is
y∗6 = C− (y1 + · · ·+y5) ≈ 148.974. The stock market prices are q1 ≈ 199.422
and q2 ≈ 265.341.
A consumer of type A, B, Q consumes, respectively,
xA(yˆ∗) ≈ (9.67742, 1.14284, 1.69707, 3.71744, 4.10566, 4.42033, 5.24044)
xB(yˆ∗) ≈ (13.6364, 4.41701, 2.53774, 1.36835, 1.51125, 3.00454, 3.56198)
xQ(yˆ∗) ≈ (24.0000, 0.89976, 1.08559, 0.83621, 0.92354, 1.02822, 1.21899).
The corresponding utility proﬁle is approximately (50.8474, 39.1841, 23.9439).
In Section 4, this proﬁle is compared with the utility proﬁles of corporation
equilibria for diﬀerent allocations of initial shares.
13
3.2 Corporation equilibria.
Let δτ denote the amount of initial shares owned by an individual consumer
of type τ = A,B,Q. At s = 0, a consumer of type τ consumes the amount
xτ0 = 30 + δ
τ (q0 − C)− ϑτ0 q0. The initial shares δτ change the consumption
by ∆xτ0 = δ
τ (q0 − C). When τ = A or τ = B there is an indirect impact on
the demand for ﬁnal shares caused by the income eﬀect. This leads to
ϑA0 =
21(30 + δA(q0 − C))
31q0
, ϑA1 = ϑ
A
0
7(q1 + y1)
8q1
, ϑA2 = ϑ
A
0
11(q2 + y2)
13q2
(11)
and
ϑB0 =
6 (30 + δB(q0 − C))
11q0
, ϑB1 = ϑ
B
0
2(q1 + y1)
5q1
, ϑB2 = ϑ
B
0
5(q2 + y2)
7q2
.
(12)
Observe that, for τ = A,B, the consumption change ∆xτ0 enters into the
demand for intermediate shares ϑi0 and, because ϑ
A
1 and ϑ
A
2 are multiples of
ϑA0 , also into the demand for ﬁnal shares.
The quasilinear type Q is diﬀerent because there is no income eﬀect and
ϑQ0 =
6
q0
, ϑQ1 = ϑ
Q
0
2q1 + y1
3q1
, ϑQ2 = ϑ
Q
0
2q2 + y2
3q2
. (13)
The initial shares δA and δB of the two non-quasilinear consumers impact
all market clearing prices. The prices are
q0 =
30 (77 δA C + 62 δB C − 7580)
2310 δA + 1860 δB − 341
q1 =
105 (77 C − 12340) δA + 24 (124 C + 54725) δB − 604630
105 (11 C + 12340) δA + 24 (186 C − 54725) δB − 304970 y1
q2 =
21 (847 C − 75500) δA + 30 (403 C + 7060) δB − 1516930
42 (77 C + 37750) δA + 12 (403 C − 17650) δB − 552410 y2.
For τ = A,B, the consumption change ∆xτ0 = δ
τ (q0 − C) appears in the
normalization factors of nf τ of τ 's utility function. These factors are equal
to the equilibrium values of
nfA = (30 + δA(q0 − C))/31 and nfB = (30 + δB(q0 − C))/22,
respectively. Since the normalization factors are not constant they must
be determined together with the optimal allocation. This completes the
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description of the Cournot-Walras model of the corporation apart from its
objective.
Consider the welfare function
W(y+) = 10 nfA(y+) UA(xA(y+))+10 nfB(y+) UB(xB(y+))+50 UQ(xQ(y+)).
(14)
The main diﬀerence between (10) and (14) is that the welfare function in
(14) depends on the S-dimensional output vector y+ whereas it depends on
the (S − 1)-dimensional vector yˆ in (10) due to the constraint q0 = C.
When does q0 equal C in the example? Because
q0 − C = 341 C − 227400
231 δA + 1860 δB − 341
the price q0 equals C if and only if C = 227400/341, Thus, the constraint
q0 = C is satisﬁed if and only if C is equal to the cost in the partnership
equilibrium of the previous subsection. This is the case if all original shares
are owned by the quasilinear type Q.
4 The impact of initial shares on welfare and
eﬃciency.
Let ∆τ denote the aggregate amount of initial shares δτi held by all consumers
of type τ where τ = A,B,Q. Within a type, the initial shares are distributed
equally. When ∆Q = 1, all initial shares are held by the quasilinear type.
In this case, q0 = C and the corporation equilibrium coincides with the
partnership equilibrium. This section contains a sequence of allocations of
initial shares starting with small departures from the partnership equilibrium
at ∆Q = 1.
Levels of ∆A and ∆B near 0.25 are of particular interest because they lead
to utility proﬁles that are nearly proportional to those in the partnership
equilibrium described in Subsection 3.1. This makes a Pareto comparison
between the partnership equilibrium and the corporation equilibrium possible
when ∆A and ∆B are suitably chosen. In various other cases, a comparison
between the two equilibria can be made with the aid of the compensating
and the equivalent surplus deﬁned in Section 3.
In all cases, described here, the ﬁrm charges a price below the production
cost C. The wedge increases when types A and B hold more initial shares. It
is worth mentioning that one can easily ﬁnd examples of economies in which
q0 lies above C. It can also happen that the signs of the total equivalent and
of the total compensating surplus diﬀer so that no comparison can be made.
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4.1 The quasilinear type holds many initial shares.
The partnership equilibrium with production plan y∗ is considered as the
reference equilibrium or status quo. It coincides with the corporation equi-
librium when ∆Q = 1. How does the cooperation equilibrium change when
types A and B obtain more and more initial shares?
Assume that ∆A = ∆B = 0.001. Then q0/C ≈ 1 − 10−6 and the output
is strictly larger than in the partnership. In the corporation, the utility of
all consumers at t = 0 is reduced while the utility at t > 0 is increased. A
and B are better oﬀ in the corporation while Q is worse oﬀ. All three types
gain from the expansion of the output. However, the cost of the expansion
is essentially borne by type Q who sells initial shares below costs. The
partnership equilibrium is ineﬃcient because price taking behavior leads to
underproduction. For the present parameter values, the size of the Hicksian
surplus measures are CSy∗ ≈ −1.05× 10−9 and ESy∗ ≈ −3.8× 10−11.
For ∆A = ∆B = 0.01, the price cost ratio decreases to q0/C ≈ 1− 1.3×
10−5 and the output has increased further. Roughly speaking, types A and
B hold now ten times more initial shares than before and the output increase
is about ten times larger than in the previous case. Again, the bulk of the
cost for this improvement is paid by type Q who subsidizes A and B. The
surpluses become CSy∗ ≈ −1.05× 10−7 and ESy∗ ≈ −3.8× 10−9. As in the
previous case, the society wants to move from the partnership equilibrium to
the corporation equilibrium.
When ∆A = ∆B = 0.1 the wedge between q0 and C increases further and
q0/C ≈ 1− 1.5× 10−4. The output increase is nearly 10 times larger than in
the case ∆A = ∆B = 0.01. As a consequence, the eﬃciency and welfare gains
increase further. More precisely, CSy∗ ≈ −1× 10−5 and ESy∗ ≈ −2.9× 106.
Until now changes in magnitude have occurred but otherwise there is
little to report. Basically, type Q loses less than types A and B gain in
total and Q's subsidies promote social welfare. The picture changes when
one considers intermediate cases that are closer to the point where no trade
in shares needs to be executed at t = 0.
4.2 More balanced distributions of initial shares.
Suppose ∆Q = 0.5 and ∆A = ∆B = 0.25. This case is of interest because the
intermediate shares ϑi0 of each of the ten consumers i of type B are slightly
below 0.025. Type Q does no longer subsidize type B but type A still gains
from purchasing shares from Q at a price below costs. Only A is better oﬀ
in the corporation. In equilibrium q0/C ≈ 0.9995, CSy∗ ≈ −5.3 × 10−5 and
ESy∗ ≈ −4.6× 10−5.
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The next goal is to determine the production plan for which the amount
of initial shares δi coincides with the amount ϑi0 of intermediate shares for
every consumer i. In this case, no subsidization takes place because no trade
occurs at t = 0. The shares of the three types are ∆A ≈ 0.3047, ∆B ≈
0.24536, ∆Q ≈ 0.540 and q0/C ≈ 0.99952.
A and B are worse oﬀ and Q is better oﬀ in the corporation. Furthermore,
CSy∗ ≈ −5.06 × 10−5 and ESy∗ ≈ −5.08 × 10−5. The market at t = 0 is
inactive but it impacts the prices in the subsequent markets. The deliberate
decision not to trade at t = 0, which is impossible in a partnership, enables
the corporation to reach a better equilibrium.
Can one ﬁnd a Pareto improvement? To answer the question one perturbs
the initial endowment such that the utility allocation of the corporation equi-
librium is approximately proportional to that of the partnership equilibrium.
It suﬃces to move from ∆A ≈ 0.3047, ∆B ≈ 0.24536 to ∆A ≈ 0.30347, ∆B ≈
0.24536. Then CSy∗ ≈ −5.027 × 10−5 andESy∗ ≈ −5.026 × 10−5 remain
nearly unchanged. However, all individual surpluses become negative so that
every consumer gains when the ﬁrm becomes a corporation. The corporation
equilibrium Pareto dominates the partnership equilibrium.
4.3 Increasing the initial shares of types A and B fur-
ther.
When ∆A = ∆B = 0.3 the situation is similar as in the case ∆A = ∆B = 0.25
considered above. This changes when ∆A = ∆B = 0.31 is reached.
Assume ∆A = ∆B = 0.31. Type Q is now a net buyer of intermediate
shares. Q's net trade with B is much larger than his net trade with A.
Because q0/C ≈ 0.99936 < 1, types A and B subsidize type Q. Due to the
increase in cost and output, all types including Q are worse oﬀ at t = 0, and
better oﬀ at t > 0, than in the partnership. In total, Q is the only type
that prefers the corporation over the partnership. Furthermore, CSy∗ ≈
−8.1× 10−5 and ESy∗ ≈ −8.9× 10−5.
Consider ∆A = ∆B = 0.4. Output and cost rise again and q0/C ≈ 0.9989.
A and B subsidize Q more than in the previous case, but qualitatively the
picture remains the same. A and B prefer the partners0hip and Q prefers
the corporation. Because CSy∗ ≈ −1.58 × 10−4 and ESy∗ ≈ −1.85 × 10−4,
type Q gains more than A and B lose together so that the corporation is
again socially preferred.
Finally, let ∆A = ∆B be nearly equal to 0.5 so that ∆Q is very close to
0. The picture becomes more pronounced but remains basically unchanged
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apart from the magnitudes of the eﬀects. Now q0/C is nearly equal to 1 and
CSy∗ ≈ −4.3×10−4 and ESy∗ ≈ −2.7×10−4 and the corporation equilibrium
is preferable.
5 Discussion of the example
In the example, the partnership equilibrium violates the ﬁrst order condition
for welfare maximization and minimal eﬃciency. One is led to ask questions
of what makes the constraint q0(y+) = C(y+) binding and of what enables a
corporation to mitigate the consequences of a binding constraint.
First, consider a weak planner who cannot change the production plan
but who can assign the shares ϑA0 and ϑ
B
0 and adjust shares of type Q ac-
cordingly. When this planner satisﬁes the same ﬁrst order condition as the
partnership then ϑA0 ≈ 0.03047 is smaller and ϑB0 ≈ 0.02401 is larger than in
the partnership equilibrium. The move from the partnership equilibrium to
the weak planner's equilibrium generates welfare and eﬃciency gains mea-
sured by CS ≈ ES ≈ −0.00039.
Second, consider a stronger planner who can also change the production
plan. This planner increases the output strictly and the cost increases from
666.862 to 667.073 and the shares. In comparison to the partnership equilib-
rium, one obtains CS ≈ −0.00044 and ES ≈ −0.00045.
The corporation can partially imitate the second planner by selling its
output below costs to increase its output, while the consumers continue to
act as price takers who ignore the impact of their decisions on market clearing
prices. However, a corporation can aim to improve welfare locally in a way
that is not available to the partnership. This can be described as follows.
Consider a production plan y∗ that gives rise to a regular partnership
equilibrium. That is to say, DWy∗(yˆ∗) has maximal rank S − 1 because
Ypart has codimension 1.
The corporation equilibrium induced by y∗ cannot be regular when all
initial shares are held by type Q because the total lack of an income eﬀect
prohibits any impact on Wy∗ . Hence, the corporation equilibrium at y∗
cannot possess the full rank S in this particular case. That is to say, the
corporation equilibrium must be critical.
Suppose that some initial shares are held by non-quasilinear consumers.
Then the rank of Wy∗ does not necessarily increase from S − 1 to S because
the eﬀect can be of second order. This occurs when the equilibrium index,
that is to say the sign of the Jacobian determinant of DWy∗(y∗), changes its
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sign. Typically, however, the corporation equilibrium at y∗ will be regular
when initial shares are held by quasilinear consumers.
The following Proposition shows that the functional form of the example
is irrelevant as long as the corporation equilibrium at y∗ is regular. In the
above example, this assumption is satisﬁed and the index equals 1.
The individual demand functions as well as the price functions qs are
assumed to be C1 (non-vanishing Gaussian curvature). Spaces of C1 func-
tions are endowed with the topology of uniform C1 convergence on compact
subsets of their domain.
Proposition. LetWy∗+ be of class C2 in a neighborhood of y∗+. Assume that
the corporation equilibrium at y∗+ is regular. Then there are corporation
equilibria with output vectors y˜+ arbitrarily close to y
∗
+ such thatWy∗(y˜+) >Wy∗(y∗).
Proof. The regularity of the corporation equilibrium at y∗+ implies that there
exists a neighborhood V of y∗+ and an  > 0 such that every C
1 function in the
-neighborhood of DWy∗ maps V diﬀeomorphically onto some neighborhood
of 0 ∈ RS. The equation DWy∗(y+) = 0 has a unique solution y˜+ in V . At
y∗+, an inﬁnitesimal move in the direction of the welfare gradient DWy∗ gives
rise to a ﬁrst order welfare gain.
Another feature of the example is less robust. Whether Kaldor-Hicks
comparisons lead to a clear conclusion depends on whether CS and ES have
the same sign. In the quasilinear case, there is a unique, well-deﬁned surplus
concept because good 0 can be used to transfer utility so that CS and ES
are identical. When one departs from the quasilinear case a second order
eﬀect drives the two surpluses apart.
In the example, ﬁfty out of seventy consumers are of the quasilinear type
Q. Furthermore, the allocation of initial shares across types A and B is
symmetric. As a consequence, all Kaldor-Hicks comparisons that have been
examined in the numerical calculations are conclusive.
Suppose now that the number of type C consumers is reduced to ten.
Then the following happens. When δA = δB is very small then CS < 0 and
ES > 0. Furthermore, ES > 0 is closer to 0 than CS. This is still the case
when δA = δB = 0.01. However, when δA = δB , has reached the level 0.02
then ES < 0. From there on, the picture stays qualitatively similar to the
one described in Section 4.
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6 Conclusions
A substantial part of the literature on production economies with incomplete
markets follows Drèze (1974) and Magill and Quinzii (1996) and deals with
economies in which all agents behave competitively. Every consumer max-
imizes utility given his state price system and every ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts
given its state price system. Drèze (1974) has shown that the ﬁrst order
condition for constrained eﬃciency in a two-period ﬁnance economy implies
that a ﬁrm should maximize proﬁts with respect to a convex sum of its
shareholders' state price systems. However, when one leaves the framework
of two-period ﬁnance models one encounters serious diﬃculties; see, for in-
stance, Geanakoplos et al. (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), and Magill and
Quinzii (1996).
This paper considers multi-period models of ﬁnance economies with pro-
duction and constant returns to scale and places the emphasis on the role of
initial shares. It is no longer taken for granted that ﬁrms act competitively.
The paper connects the literature on production economies with incomplete
markets with the literature on Cournot-Walras models.
The paper illustrates a source of ineﬃciency that diﬀers form those pointed
out in the literature mentioned above. The ineﬃciency occurs because not
only consumers but also ﬁrms act as price takers. These eﬀects can be mit-
igated by corporations with initial shares. In a partnership economy with
constant returns, the consumers pay in total the production costs C in order
to obtain the dividend stream, whereas the initial shares of a corporation are
sold at a price q0 that can be below or above C.
Price taking agents are myopic in the sense that they ignore the impact of
their portfolio choices on subsequent market prices. Therefore, the portfolio
choices of consumers can lead to over- or underproduction. When there is
underproduction as in the example in Section 4, a price q0 < C tends to
stimulate the demand for shares so that the scale of production is increased
due to income eﬀects. A partnership is unable to make such a correction. As
shown in the example, corporation equilibria can Pareto dominate partnership
equilibria if the initial shares are suitably chosen.
However, Pareto comparisons cannot be made for most allocations of ini-
tial shares. Therefore, the paper uses a Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion
that involves two Hicksian surplus concepts, the compensating surplus and
the equivalent surplus. The compensating surplus measures losses due to
ineﬃciency, the equivalent surplus measures welfare changes. Only two equi-
libria at a time are compared so that the lack of transitivity of Kaldor-Hicks
comparisons is irrelevant.
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The role of the initial shares is examined for a variety of initial allocations
where the Kaldor-Hicks comparison is conclusive. The computations show
that selling shares below costs can improve welfare as well as eﬃciency also
when the equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. In other examples, the situation
is similar when corporations sell their shares above cost. It can happen that
the compensating and the equivalent surplus have diﬀerent signs and do not
lead to a clear conclusion.
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